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The general aim of the research project “International law through the national 
prism: the impact of judicial dialogue” was to deepen the understanding of how 
courts engage in the interpretation, application and development of internation-
al law through transnational judicial dialogue. The dialogue is  thus regarded as 
a tool that may serve well the development of the international legal order and the 
strengthening of the rule of law within it by domestic and international courts. 
For purposes of  the research project, judicial dialogue was defined exten-
sively, as any reference, whether affirmative or critical, by one court to the  ju-
risprudence of  another concerning, of  course, questions of  international law. 
Such ‘indirect dialogue’ is  the prevailing form of  interaction available to most 
national and international courts. This is the case because within the framework 
of international legal order or its particular regimes there exist usually no formal 
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mechanisms enabling a ‘direct dialogue’, understood as a dialogue involving con-
tact and exchange of views, between domestic and foreign or international courts 
on a given legal problem.1 The European Union makes the most significant ex-
ception in that respect.2
One issue needs to be clarified at the  very beginning of  this analysis. For 
the purposes of the present paper, but also generally in the author’s view, EU law 
is regarded as a part of international law, created by Member States of an interna-
tional organization and the organization itself. Despite some particular character-
istics (which themselves also originate from concepts of international law, as e.g. 
direct effect and primacy are derived from monist theories) and a certain extent 
of autonomy, the EU legal order can only be described as an autonomous regime, 
a subsystem of  international law. As such, it comes within the substantial scope 
of the present research project. 
Moreover, among these particular features of the EU legal order there are fac-
tors determining the phenomenon of judicial dialogue in the European Union. One 
of them is the establishment of a judicial organ of the organization, which, now-
adays, has become a whole system of judicial bodies functioning under the name 
of “the Court of Justice of the European Union” (CJEU). It holds compulsory juris-
diction over the EU, its Member States and institutions with a competence to “en-
sure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed” 
(Art. 19 TEU). The other feature is the inclusion in this judicial system of Member 
States’ domestic courts as guardians of effectiveness of EU law on the national lev-
el, substantially as a consequence of direct effect and other principles of EU law 
and  formally through the  establishment of  a  procedural mechanism generating 
the direct judicial dialogue on EU law between the national courts and the CJEU: 
the preliminary reference procedure (Art. 267 TFEU).3 
Thus, there is no controversy in stating that by founding the European Com-
munities, which then evolved into the present European Union, the Member States 
had created a legal system where judicial dialogue was, from the outset, an inher-
ent instrument for development of law.4 However, the literature, which examines, 
explicitly or implicitly, the topics of preliminary reference and of EU legal order 
development in the context of judicial dialogue is rather sparse.5 Therefore, it was 
1 For some instances other than the EU see: R. Virzo, ‘The Preliminary Ruling Procedures at 
International Regional Courts and Tribunals’ (2011) 10 The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals, p. 285.
2 See: A. Arnull, ‘Judicial Dialogue in  the European Union’, [in:] J. Dickinson, P. Eleftheriadis 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 118.
3 Farrell A. Miller, ‘The Preliminary Reference Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities: A  Model for the  ICJ’ (2009) 32 Hastings International and  Comparative Law 
Review, p. 677.
4 See: F. Jacobs, ‘Judicial dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: the European 
Court of Justice’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal, p. 548.
5 Alongside the works already cited we may mention: J. Cohen, ‘The European Preliminary Ref-
erence and the US Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative 
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considered worthy to include this issue into the  research project. As the  result, 
the present paper examines the CJEU jurisprudence, which results from prelim-
inary reference practice of  four of  the Central and  East European EU Member 
States, which are examined in this research project, namely the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. The examination includes rulings issued in a pe-
riod from their EU accession (1 May 2004) until 14 February 2016.
It needs to be stated that the task of identification of preliminary reference cases 
coming from the four Member States was not a very hard one, thanks to the CJEU 
jurisprudence database and  the research tools provided there. The  multilingual 
character of the EU, reflected inter alia in the obligation to publish the documents 
of general application in all official languages of the Union,6 is retained also in re-
spect to the CJEU.7 The publication of the CJEU judgments in all EU languages 
and of the orders at least in French and the language of proceedings, made it pos-
sible for such research to be conducted by a single person in a comparative way. 
This also confirms the crucial role that linguistic availability plays in any study 
involving empirical examination of case law of international and – especially – na-
tional courts. In the effect, over two hundred twenty cases of preliminary rulings 
on references stemming from the four States were identified.8 Only cases closed 
within the research period were taken into consideration.
If the  matter of  judicial dialogue is  to be regarded purely technically, each 
of  the over two hundred identified cases constitutes an instance of  a  dialogue: 
there is a question on a legal issue and then there is a reply. However, the present 
study focuses on the substance of such dialogue and its relevance for the evolution 
Judicial Federalism’ (1996) 44 AJIL, p. 421; G. Martinico, O. Pollicino, The Interaction between 
Europe’s Legal Systems. Judicial Dialogue and  the Creation of  Supranational Laws (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2012); M. Cartabia, ‘Taking Dialogue Seriously The Renewed Need for a Ju-
dicial Dialogue at the Time of Constitutional Activism in the European Union’ (2007) 12 Jean 
Monnet Working Papers; M. Claes, M. de Visser, ‘Are You Networked Yet? On Dialogues in Euro-
pean Judicial Networks’ (2012) 8 Utrecht Law Review, p. 100; R.D. Kelemen, ‘The Court of Jus-
tice of The European Union in The Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary 
Problems, p. 117; C. Carruba, L. Murrah ‘Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling 
Process in the European Union’ (2005) 59 International Organization, p. 399. For critical as-
sessment of the ‘dialogue’ concept see: K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: 
The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2001), p. 38; 
A. Dyevre, ‘Domestic Judicial Non-Compliance in the European Union: A Political Economic 
Approach’ (2013) 2 LSE Law, Society, Economy Working Papers. 
6 Art. 4 of Regulation No. 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community, O.J. 17 1958 385, last amended by Council Regulation (EU) 517/2013 of 13 May 
2013, O.J. L 158 2013 1.
7 Arts. 36–40, Rules of  Procedure of  the Court of  Justice of  25 September 2012 (O.J. L 265, 
29.9.2012), as amended on 18 June 2013, O.J. L 173 2013 65.
8 The aim of the research was not to provide statistical information and no statistical methods 
are used. However, we refer to the numbers, usually in approximate way just to show the to-
tal amount and particular share of each State, the diversification of subject matter of refer-
ences and the interplay between amount and significance of references.
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of EU legal order. Thus preliminary rulings are subject to a thorough analysis as to 
whether and how they contribute to the development of EU law, whether and how 
they strengthen the rule of law and influence the protection of individual rights 
within the  European Union, whether they concern legal problems of  universal 
character, of interest to more Member States (and not just to the referring State) 
and are likely to be generally followed and finally – whether they involve a more 
extensive argumentation of the courts that would enhance the quality of the dia-
logue. The result of this analysis is the selection of the most significant preliminary 
rulings, which are further discussed in the present paper. 
It was not possible to examine the follow-up to the CJEU preliminary rulings 
at the  national courts within the  framework of  the present study. Due to limi-
tations of languages and accessibility, such task would have gone beyond the ca-
pacity of a sole researcher and would require engagement of a team of scholars. 
Moreover, the issue of judicial dialogue in respect of EU law may be regarded as 
a separate subject of research, and, as such, it definitively deserves a comprehen-
sive study (as mentioned earlier, it is rather underexploited in the doctrine). Here, 
only some aspects have been considered in  a  limited way and  with a  focus on 
the selected CEE States just as one of complementary topics within a more com-
plex research project. 
2. The Dialogue-generating Features 
of the Preliminary Reference Procedure
For the purposes of the present study it is neither necessary to describe in de-
tail the preliminary reference procedure, nor useful to discuss all legal problems 
linked with it. In fact, there are numerous handbooks, monographs and articles 
dealing with the procedure in general as well as with specific issues.9 Therefore, 
we shall refer to the contents of Art. 267 TFEU only in general terms and focus on 
these features of the procedure, which determine its discursive nature. 
According to Art. 267, any court (or tribunal) of a Member State may refer to 
the CJEU any question raised in a case before it concerning interpretation of the 
Treaties, or interpretation or validity of acts of the EU institutions or other EU 
bodies, if such a court considers a ruling on this question necessary for a judg-
ment in a specific case. Where a court against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law decides a case, that court is under obligation to refer 
the matter to the CJEU. However, this obligation arises only when the referring 
9 For recent comprehensive presentation see: M. Broberg, N. Fergen, Preliminary References to 
the European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2014).
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court first regards the reply to be indispensable for deciding a case. The CJEU 
preliminary ruling, given in  reply to the  national court’s reference, is  binding 
upon that court, since “the aim of judicial cooperation between national courts 
and  the Court of  Justice under Article 177 [present Art. 267] is  to ensure that 
community law is applied in a unified manner throughout the Member States.”10 
Moreover, in accordance with the settled case law of the CJEU, the preliminary 
rulings have also erga omnes effect, binding on courts other than the referring 
court in a sense that those courts cannot ignore the CJEU ruling, but they may 
either follow it or decide to make on their own another preliminary reference 
concerning the same problem.11 
The occasionally compulsory character of  references and  the (individually 
and generally) binding force of preliminary rulings provide the basic arguments 
for denying the discursive nature of the preliminary reference procedure.12 Ac-
cording to this position, one might speak about ‘judicial dialogue’ only when 
the interaction between courts is voluntary and there is no relation of subordina-
tion, dependency or even reliance between them. However, acceptance of such ar-
gumentation would lead to denial of the ‘dialogue’ quality in many cases of insti-
tutionalized judicial interaction. Yet, this is actually the matter of defining judicial 
dialogue and, of course, each researcher is free to determine the subject of his/
hers research. As stated earlier, within the present project the broadest possible 
approach to judicial dialogue is adopted.13 Our interests are focused on the fact 
that one court having faced a legal problem, which it needs to solve, is seeking 
the  opinion of  another court, of  an international or foreign court, concerning 
the same or similar problem, and on the outcome of  such interaction between 
the courts. From this perspective it does not matter whether such reference to 
other jurisdiction is direct, induced by a procedural requirement, consists in pos-
ing a question to have it answered by the other court or indirect, made of  free 
choice (if not on an impulse) and often reduced to a  random quotation of  the 
other court’s judgment. 
M. Claes and  M. de Visser present another argument for the  denial of  the 
discursive character of the preliminary reference procedure. They refuse to qual-
ify it as a  ‘real’ judicial dialogue and  stress the  lack of  a  ‘discussion’ between 
10 Case 69/85 Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. v Federal Republic of Germany (order, 
5 March 1986), paras 12–13. 
11 A. Farrell Miller, ‘The Preliminary Reference Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities: A Model for the ICJ’, pp. 676–677. For detailed analysis of preliminary ruling 
effects see: M. Broberg, N. Fergen (n. 10), p. 441 and the case law quoted there.
12 This line of  argumentation was invoked e.g. in  a  presentation of  Ch. Fardet during the  in-
ternational colloquy La concurrence des juges en Europe – le dialogue en question(s) (Tours, 
25–27 November 2015), and  in the  discussions hereinafter. The  author participated in  the 
colloquy. The video records of the colloquy are available at: <https://juges-en-europe.scienc-
esconf.org/resource/page/id/10> (access: 10 June 2016). 
13 See in that respect the text of A. Wyrozumska in the present volume. 
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the CJEU and the referring court in the course of proceedings.14 Claes and de 
Visser claim that, on one hand, the role of referring court is restricted to posing 
the question and to the application of the CJEU’s answer and, on the other, that 
the CJEU rulings are variable and unpredictable and thus sometimes not very 
useful for the national courts.15 There are, however, some contradictions in their 
argumentation. It  seems that the authors would recognize as judicial dialogue 
only a situation where a direct multiple exchange of views between the courts or 
judges takes place. It is, however, impossible to introduce such discussions be-
tween the courts in any judicial proceedings, especially if foreign or internation-
al courts were to be involved. The narrowing of  the understanding of  judicial 
dialogue would also result in leaving the indirect dialogue outside of the scope 
of  definition of  judicial dialogue. These would be situations where one court 
merely refers to case law of another court, usually without the latter’s knowledge 
of the fact and the possibility to react. Furthermore, there are procedural means 
provided for in  the CJEU’s Rules of  procedure serving the  increase, if neces-
sary, of the involvement of the referring court in the CJEU deliberations. These 
are a  request for clarification from the CJEU to the referring court (Art. 101) 
and the possibility of making subsequent references to the CJEU, if the nation-
al court decides that further guidance is required (Art. 104). The fact that na-
tional courts do not avail themselves of these subsequent references very often 
indicates rather that CJEU’s preliminary rulings usually are  sufficiently clear 
and useful for the national courts. Interestingly, Claes and de Visser take notice 
of these regulations (in a footnote) but consider them not significant enough to 
affect their allegations and understanding of the notion of a dialogue.16 It is also 
hard to understand why the variability and unpredictability of CJEU’s decisions 
would question the  discursive character of  preliminary reference procedure. 
In other words, why refer a question, if one may predict the result? The capacity 
to anticipate the answer does not seem to be a feature that induces the dialogue; 
it seems more like the one preventing it.
Last but not least, there is a point where the two positions contesting the di-
alogic nature of preliminary reference procedure clash. According to the former 
view, there can be no dialogue if the national court is obliged to make a reference. 
According to the  latter, one cannot speak about dialogue in  the context of pre-
liminary reference procedure, if it is so easy to avoid such dialogue by simply not 
making a reference.17 Actually, if all these arguments were to be taken seriously, 
we would have to assume an opinion that no such thing as judicial dialogue exists 
14 M. Claes, M. de Visser, ‘Are You Networked Yet? On Dialogues in European Judicial Networks’, 
p. 104. They refer to the dialogue typology by L. Tremblay in ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Re-
view: The Limits of Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures’ (2005) 3 International Journal 
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in practice, not only in respect of preliminary reference procedure, but at all. And 
this is the main danger that may result from narrowing down the definitions of ju-
dicial dialogue.
In our view, many of the features argued above as disqualifying the discur-
sive nature of  the preliminary reference procedure are  in fact confirming it. 
But maybe the last word on this issue should be given to the actor concerned, 
the  CJEU alone. In  2008 the  Court gave preliminary ruling in  the German 
case Kempter.18 The case concerned interpretation of the CJEU judgment Küh-
ne & Heitz19 as to whether in order to contest a  final administrative decision 
on the basis of  the Kühne & Heitz rules, the party concerned must have had 
first raised the issue of EU law in the earlier proceedings before national court, 
which disregarded such issue at that time and, having issued a judgement with-
out a  reference to the  CJEU, made the  contested administrative decision fi-
nal.20 The  CJEU ruled, quite predictably, that no such requirement could be 
derived from the Kühne & Heitz judgment. In its reasoning the Court expressly 
stated that “the system of references for a preliminary ruling is based on a di-
alogue between one court and another, the initiation of which depends entire-
ly on the national court’s assessment as to whether a reference is appropriate 
and  necessary”. The  Court agreed in  that respect with the  opinion of  Advo-
cate General Y. Bot.21 The  Advocate General recalled the  existing CJEU case 
law, originating from the Cilfit judgement,22 concerning the scope of obligation 
of national courts of  last instance to make a preliminary reference including 
the  situations where national courts might be exempted from the obligation. 
He concluded, and  this position was subsequently adopted by the  CJEU (as 
quoted above), that the decision to make or not to make a reference for a pre-
liminary ruling depended entirely on a national court’s assessment and in no 
way depended on the pleas of the parties to the main proceedings. Both the Ad-
vocate General and the CJEU consider this freedom of assessment as to the ne-
cessity of a reference as a dialogue-generating feature of the preliminary ruling 
procedure.23 Of equal relevance is the discretionary power of a national court 
to decide whether it obtained sufficient guidance from the preliminary ruling 
delivered in response to its reference or whether it would be necessary to refer 
to the CJEU on the matter again.24 
18 Case C-2/06 Willy Kempter KG v  Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (CJEU, 12 February 2008), 
para. 42. 
19 Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren (CJEU, 13 January 
2004).
20 Case C-2/06 Kempter judgement, para. 21.
21 Case C-2/06 Willy Kempter KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (Advocate General Y. Bot opin-
ion, 24 April 2007), paras 99–104.
22 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health (CJEU, 6 October 1982).
23 See also: N. Fennely, ‘Preliminary Reference Procedure: A Factual and Legal Review’ (2006) 
13 Irish Journal of European Law, p. 72.
24 Case C-2/06 Kempter opinion, para. 101.
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Just a  couple of  months later the  CJEU confirmed the  dialogic character 
of preliminary reference procedure in the Hungarian case Cartesio, which is ac-
tually one of the most significant examples of contribution of the CEE Member 
States preliminary reference practice to the development of EU law.25 The case 
concerned several legal issues, which are considered below in a more detailed 
way. Thus, at this point it is  sufficient to mention that the  discursive nature 
of  preliminary reference system is  indicated here on the  occasion of  exam-
ination, whether a  measure of  domestic law providing the  possibility to ap-
peal against a national court’s decision on making a preliminary reference to 
the CJEU (existing under Hungarian law) could limit the national court’s power 
to make such reference stemming directly from Art.  267 TFEU if, in  appeal 
proceedings, the superior court might amend the decision, declare the request 
for a  preliminary ruling inoperative and  order the  referring court to resume 
the  suspended proceedings before it. The CJEU stated that, although EU law 
did not generally preclude a  decision on preliminary reference from remain-
ing subject to the  remedies normally available under national law (including 
appeal), nevertheless, the outcome of such a remedy could not limit the juris-
diction conferred by Art. 267 TFEU to national court to make a  reference to 
the CJEU, because the assessment of the relevance and necessity of the question 
was the  responsibility of  the referring court alone (subject only to the  limit-
ed verification by the CJEU).26 Therefore, only the referring court may decide, 
taking into account the appeal outcome, whether to maintain the preliminary 
reference, amend it or withdraw.27 Thus, the  discretion of  the national court 
was reaffirmed as a  factor relevant for the  dialogue character of  preliminary 
reference procedure.
The scope of discretion on the part of the CJEU is equally relevant for elabo-
rating the court-to-court dialogue within the preliminary reference procedure. 
As T. Tridimas rightly points out, the Court, while exercising its functions un-
der Art. 267 TFEU, enjoys a significant range of discretion, that manifests itself 
in  a  number of  respects.28 First, the  CJEU is  free to assess whether the  refer-
ring court provided information sufficient to give the preliminary ruling and, 
if necessary, request clarification or dismiss the request. It may well decide to 
refuse to give the answer when it finds the question does not in  fact concern 
issues of EU law or is hypothetical.29 However, the Court has wide discretionary 
powers when it comes to evaluation of factual and legal background presented 
25 Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt (CJEU, judgement, 16 December 2008), 
para. 91.
26 Ibidem, paras 93–94.
27 Ibidem, para. 96.
28 T. Tridimas, ‘The CJEU and the Specifity of Preliminary Reference Rulings: Some Reflections’, 
[in:] S. Besson, P. Pichonnaz (eds), Les principes de droit européen – Principles in European 
Law (L.G.D.J. 2011), p. 332.
29 See: ibidem, 332–333 and the CJEU case law quoted there: N. Fennely (n. 24), p. 72.
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by a  national court, which may even result in  reformulation of  the questions 
referred or in  taking into consideration other EU rules and  provisions than 
those, to which the national court refers. All that is put in place in order to pro-
vide the national court with the best possible knowledge that would be helpful 
for deciding the case pending before it.30 The  reformulation technique is par-
ticularly useful where a referring court phrased its question expressly in terms 
of compatibility of national provisions with EU law. This is a question, in  line 
with the standing jurisprudence of the CJEU, on which only the national court 
is competent to decide, even though this is done on the basis of EU law interpre-
tation given by the CJEU.31 
Another factor determining the dialogic character of the preliminary refer-
ence procedure is  the lack of any hierarchical relationship between the CJEU 
and  national courts.32 The  CJEU is  neither appellate instance for domes-
tic courts, nor has jurisdiction to examine and  repeal national regulations. 
The binding effects of preliminary rulings are limited to the explanation of is-
sues of EU law (concerning its interpretation or validity) referred to the CJEU.33 
They do  not settle the  case pending before the  national court, but as stated 
above, provide answers necessary for deciding the case by this court. It is only 
a referring national court alone that is competent to assess whether, and how, 
the obtained preliminary ruling may be applied to the factual and legal circum-
stances of the given case.
The quality of  the judicial dialogue within the preliminary reference proce-
dure depends, on the one hand, on the extent and accuracy of information giv-
en by a national court on facts and legal background of the proceedings in re-
spect to which the  reference is  made. On the  other hand, it is  determined by 
the  specificity of  the preliminary ruling delivered by the  CJEU. A  proposal by 
Tridimas is to distinguish a three-degree scale of specificity of preliminary rul-
ings:34 the ‘outcome cases’ where the CJEU suggests a ready solution to the dis-
pute before national court;35 ‘guidance cases’ where the  CJEU provides guide-
lines to a national court on how to resolve the case;36 and ‘deference cases’ where 
the CJEU answers in  such general terms that it leaves it to a national court to 
decide on the issue.37 Although this classification aims to demonstrate how much 
the degree of specificity and the margin of discretion left to national courts may 
vary in respect to different preliminary rulings, it appears not very useful in prac-
tice. Its author himself states that the thresholds of the categories are somewhat 
30 Ibidem. See also: M. Broberg, N. Fergen (n. 10), p. 362. 
31 Ibidem, p. 412. See also: A. Arnull (n. 3), p. 118.
32 See: F. Jacobs (n. 5), p. 548; A. Dyevre (n. 6), p. 9.
33 M. Broberg, N. Fergen (n. 10), p. 441. 
34 T. Tridimas (n. 29), p. 333.
35 Ibidem, p. 334.
36 Ibidem, p. 336. 
37 Ibidem, p. 340.
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floating and they may coexist in the same ruling.38 Probably the biggest weakness 
of Tridimas’ approach lies in the fact that his typology is elaborated on the basis 
of criteria applied in abstracto to the CJEU preliminary rulings without any con-
nection to the follow up and final outcome of their application by the national 
courts. Therefore, instead of  multiplying categories it may be more reasonable 
to state that the degree of specificity of preliminary rulings may vary from case 
to case, but it is related above all to the subject of  the questions and the speci-
ficity of information referred to the CJEU by a national court. It is the interplay 
of  the different aspects of discretion, interdependence and reliance on the part 
of both, the CJEU and the national courts that make the preliminary reference 
system the best example of a direct judicial dialogue. These factors surface also 
in the cases examined within the present study.
3. The Preliminary Reference Practice of the 
Courts in the Selected CEE Member States 
and Its Impact on the Development of EU Law
3.1. The Czech Republic
Within the  research period the  CJEU responded to thirty-four preliminary 
references submitted by the Czech courts (and further four were withdrawn by 
the national referring court). Just one reference within the  set was declared in-
admissible, although it has to be stressed that such outcome of the case does not 
automatically exclude its potential contribution to the development of EU law. It is 
not so uncommon that a  reference, which finally turns out to be inadmissible, 
gives rise to legal problems, which are explained by the CJEU in an order dismiss-
ing the reference.
The Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní soud) submitted about 
the  half of  the cases. In  addition, some of  the remaining references came from 
the administrative divisions of provincial courts (Krajský soud). Thus the question 
of application of EU law in relations between an individual and Member State au-
thorities clearly prevails in the Czech preliminary reference practice.
Interestingly, one of the first cases referred to by a Czech court to the CJEU 
turned out to become a landmark case in the jurisprudence on the principle of le-
gal certainty. It is the famous Skoma-Lux (I) case.39 Skoma-Lux was a Czech com-
38 Ibidem, p. 334.
39 Case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux sro v Celní ředitelství Olomouc (CJEU, 11 December 2007).
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pany (specializing in  international wine and  liquor trading), which brought to 
the Provincial Court (Krajský soud) in Ostrava an action for annulment of several 
decisions of Czech customs authorities imposing fines for alleged infringements 
of  certain customs provisions of  Czech law, as well as EC Regulation 2454/93. 
The  alleged offences were supposed to occur several times between 11 March 
and  20 May 2004 (so before and  after the  accession of  the Czech Republic to 
the EU). The company based its action (in the part concerning the EU law) on 
the plea of inapplicability of the Union regulation to the alleged offences, includ-
ing those which occurred after the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, as 
on the dates when the acts in dispute were committed that regulation had not yet 
been published in the Czech language in the Official Journal of the European Un-
ion.40 So the national court referred to the CJEU questions concerning the case, 
of which the essential one read:
May Article 58 of  the Act concerning the  conditions of  accession, on the  basis of  which 
the Czech Republic became a Member State of  the European Union as from 1 May 2004, 
be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may apply against an individual a regulation 
which at the time of its application has not been properly published in the Official Journal 
of the European Union in the official language of that Member State?
The first noticeable symptoms of  the importance of  the case were, firstly, 
the fact that it was decided by the Grand Chamber and, secondly, that there was 
quite a broad interest among other Member States, which eventually intervened 
in  the proceedings.41 Such factors at first sight, though they do  not grant that 
the  outcome, will meet the  expectations, indicate that one may suspect a  giv-
en case of having potential for significant influence on the development of EU 
law. However, what we shall focus on in the present paper is the discursive as-
pect of the preliminary ruling. It is remarkable how carefully the referring court 
considered the problem in the light of  the CJEU previous case law concerning 
the publication of EU legal acts.42 It pointed out to the Oryzomyli judgment where 
the Court stated that the absence of proper publication of a Community act in the 
Official Journal could constitute a ground for its unenforceability against individ-
uals.43 Regarding circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, the referring 
court stressed that the provisional translations of the regulation were available on 
the internet (on EU and Czech Ministry of Finance websites), and noticed that 
interested parties usually acquaint themselves with legal rules in  an electronic 
form. The absence of publication in the Official Journal then would not always 
40 Ibidem, para. 14.
41 These were – besides of course the Czech government and the Commission – the Estonian, 
Latvian, Polish, Slovak and Swedish governments.
42 Case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux, paras 18–21.
43 Case 160/84 Oryzomyli Kavallas and Others (CJEU, 15 May 1986), paras 11–21.
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result in factual unavailability of the content of a legal act.44 Therefore, a possi-
ble solution to the problem might involve the acceptance that the applicability 
of EU legislation not published in the relevant language should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, examining whether an individual concerned had a pos-
sibility of  getting to know the  content of  the act. In  case of  Skoma-Lux such 
finding would lead to an assumption that as a company operating internationally 
it had to be aware of  the customs rules known in  all Member States. Howev-
er, the referring court further observed that the formal requirement of a proper 
publication of legislation in an official language of a person to whom it applies 
is one of the basic safeguards for observance of the principles of legal certainty 
and equality of citizens, confirmed by the CJEU case law, and that the parallel 
existence of a number of non-official divergent translations would increase legal 
uncertainty.45 Precisely the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment of in-
dividuals within the scope of EU law were the two major grounds that the CJEU 
relied on in its ruling. The Court emphasized that although Community legisla-
tion was indeed available on Internet in that form and used by individuals more 
and more frequently, it was not equivalent to a valid publication in the Official 
Journal in the absence of any rules in that regard in EU law.46 Thus, the CJEU 
could not accept such form of making EU legislation available to be a sufficient 
basis for the enforceability of provisions. The Court confirmed that the only au-
thentic version of an EU regulation was that in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union.47 Consequently, the CJEU ruled that Art. 58 of the Act concerning 
the conditions of accession “precluded the obligations contained in Community 
legislation which has not been published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union in the language of a new Member State, where that language is an official 
language of  the Union, from being imposed on individuals in  that State, even 
though those persons could have learned of  that legislation by other means.”48 
The  reply given to the provincial court’s reference was thus unequivocal, leav-
ing no space for doubt on the part of the referring court as to how to apply this 
interpretation to the pending case. As a late development that partly might have 
originated in the Skoma-Lux case one may regard the adoption of Council Reg-
ulation (EU) No. 216/2013 of 7 March 2013 on the electronic publication of the 
Official Journal of the European Union,49 which granted equal status to the print-
ed and the electronic version of Official Journal as means for official publication 
of EU legislation. Its enactment, however, would not change the situation in Sko-
ma-Lux, as the  Regulation considers as authentic only the  electronic version 
of Official Journal and no other sources available on the Internet. 
44 Ibidem, para. 19.
45 Ibidem, para. 21 and the case law cited there.
46 Ibidem, para. 48.
47 Ibidem, paras 49–50.
48 Ibidem, para. 51.
49 O.J. L 69 2013 1. 
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Just by a pure chance, the two probably most famous Czech preliminary ruling 
cases (Skoma-Lux being the first one) are also significant in respect of judicial dia-
logue. Although in the case of the second one – the Landtová ruling50 – what started 
as an attempt of dialogue ended up as a multilevel, multidimensional inter-court 
dispute.51 The essential legal issue of the case before the Czech courts originated 
in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (which effected on 1 January 1993) and the 
measures agreed and adopted by the two new States to deal with various problems 
resulting from the dissolution. One of them was the Agreement on Social Security 
of 29 October 1992 between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which 
in its Art. 20(1) settled the rule for recognition of social insurance periods.52 As 
a result the benefits were to be calculated according to the rules of social security 
system of that contracting State (so either Czech Republic or Slovakia) in which 
the relevant insurance periods were completed and subject to the responsibility 
of this States social security authorities. Thus a person of Czech nationality, who 
acquired the pension entitlement in Czech Republic, but a part of his/hers insur-
ance periods were completed in the Slovak territory before the dissolution date, 
had the  respective part of  the benefit calculated under the  Slovak system rules 
and paid by Slovak institution. That was the case of Ms. M. Landtová. However, 
in 2005 the Czech Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) issued a judgment on in-
terpretation of Art. 20(1) of the abovementioned Agreement. Accordingly, where 
a Czech national (residing also in Czech Republic) satisfies the conditions for en-
titlement to a pension and the amount of it as set by Czech law is greater than that 
laid down by the social security Agreement, the Czech Social Security Authority 
(CSSA) must ensure that the  retirement pension is  of an amount equivalent to 
the  higher entitlement (set by Czech legislation). Therefore, the  CSSA supple-
ments the retirement pension paid by the other contracting State, which must be 
taken into account in order to avoid double payment of two retirement pensions 
of  the same kind, granted on the  same grounds by two separate social security 
institutions.53
Ms. Landtová in 2006 was awarded a partial retirement pension by the CSSA, 
however her benefit was calculated solely on the basis of  the Slovak scheme. 
She challenged the  decision before the  Metropolitan Court in  Prague (Měst-
ský soud v Praze). The Court annulled the CSSA’s decision in accordance with 
the 2005 Constitutional Court judgment and concluded that the benefit paid 
50 Case C-399/09 Marie Landtová v Česká správa socialního zabezpečení (CJEU, 22 June 2011).
51 The case before Czech courts known as Slovak Pension Rights, see to that respect A. Dyevre 
(n. 10) and the texts by Wyrozumska and Skomerska-Muchowska in the present volume.
52 “[P]eriods of  insurance completed before the  date of  dissolution of  the Czech and  Slovak 
Federal Republic shall be considered to be periods of insurance completed in the contracting 
State on whose territory the employer of the person concerned had its headquarters either 
on the day of the dissolution, or on the last day before that date”; Case C-399/09 Landtová, 
paras 8–9.
53 Case III. ÚS 252/04 (Czech Constitutional Court, 25 January 2005).
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to Ms. Landtová by the CSSA should be adjusted up to the amount that would 
be due under the Czech social security scheme. The CSSA brought an appeal 
on a point of  law before the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní 
soud). The latter set aside the judgment of the Metropolitan Court and referred 
the  case back for reconsideration, questioning i.a. whether the  2005 Consti-
tutional Court judgment and  the preferential treatment granted thereby to 
nationals of  the Czech Republic were compatible with the principle of  equal 
treatment laid down in  Article 3(1) of  Regulation 1408/71.54 Nevertheless, 
the Metropolitan Court upheld its position and ruled that the CSSA was re-
quired to supplement the  benefit. Subsequently the  CSSA brought another 
appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, claiming that the obligation to 
adjust the benefits solely for individuals of Czech nationality residing in the ter-
ritory of the Czech Republic under the conditions set out in the 2005 judgment, 
was contrary to Art. 3 of the Regulation 1408/71 (principle of equal treatment) 
and  since, such an obligation also involved taking into account Slovak peri-
ods of insurance, it was also contrary to Art. 12 (stating that the same period 
of insurance cannot be taken into account twice). The Supreme Administrative 
Court shared the  CSSA doubts and  submitted a  reference for a  preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU.55 
The Court of Justice admitted that the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 did 
not preclude a national rule, which provided for payment of a  supplement to 
pension benefit in the circumstances established under the 2005 Constitution-
al Court judgment.56 Nevertheless, with regard to the principle of equal treat-
ment, the CJEU was not convinced by the arguments of uniqueness and special-
ty of the national regulation, which had been adopted to deal with the effects 
of  an exceptional situation of  dissolution of  a  State and  creation of  two new 
States. It  ruled that provisions of  Regulation  1408/71 did preclude a  national 
rule, which allowed payment of a supplement to old age benefit solely to Czech 
nationals residing in  the territory of  the Czech Republic. At least, the  CJEU 
stressed that it did not necessarily follow from such statement that, under EU 
law, a person who satisfied the two requirements of nationality and residence 
should be deprived of such a payment. The idea behind the CJEU ruling was, 
therefore, not to restrict the  supplement system but to enable also individu-
als other than Czech nationals resident in Czech Republic, and fulfilling other 
criteria, to benefit from it. One may wonder whether this was the  judgment 
the CSSA and the referring court might have hoped for. Despite that, the CJEU 
was heavily criticized for this ruling and the critique cannot be called as wholly 
54 Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of  the Council of  14 June 1971 on the  application of  social 
security schemes to employed persons and  their families moving within the  Community, 
O.J. L 149 1971 2, with subsequent amendments.
55 Case C-399/09 Landtová, paras 23–25.
56 Ibidem, paras 31–40.
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undeserved.57 In our view, Landtová makes a perfect example of a case where 
both courts lost a great opportunity to remain silent. The right way to act was 
shown twice by the  court of  first instance in  the domestic proceedings –  the 
Metropolitan Court, which though induced by the first appeal judgment of the 
Supreme Administrative Court, used its freedom and did not regard the expla-
nation of  EU law issues necessary to enable it to decide the  case. It  is hard 
to resist the  impression that the driving force that led the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court to file the  request for a  preliminary ruling was the  rivalry with 
the Constitutional Court and the desire to have the latter’s judgment reversed 
by using the  preliminary ruling of  the CJEU. The  CJEU could have avoided 
the dialogue as well, by declaring the questions irrelevant for the domestic pro-
ceedings. The  national regulation in  question was a  recognized exception to 
the EU social security coordination system, it was justified by unique situation 
of dissolution of a State long before the EU accession of its successors and, last 
but not least, it concerned a really limited group of  individuals, which would 
diminish year by year until they would simply die out. One must really ask what 
reason, other than vanity, made the CJEU entertain this case, bearing in mind 
that before and afterwards it gave rise to such a controversy among the judiciary 
and scholars, crowned by the unprecedented declaration of the CJEU judgment 
as ultra vires by the Czech Constitutional Court in 2012.58 This case constitutes 
a remarkable (and a surprising) example that judicial dialogue may be driven 
by emotions. Then the dialogue does not bring any good. One may only hope 
that the CJEU and the national courts would draw right conclusions from this 
example to avoid similar situations in the future. 
3.2. Hungary
Of the  four EU Member States studied in  our research Hungary is  the one 
with by far the largest number of preliminary references submitted, both in terms 
of absolute numbers and in relation to the country’s size and population.59 With-
in the research period there were ninety-four cases submitted and closed. Eight 
of them were removed from the register due to withdrawal. In eleven instances, 
the CJEU declared its lack of jurisdiction. Among these eleven, in one particularly 
important Ynos case the declaration was made by means of a  judgment instead 
of an order.60 As to the referring courts, there is no leading category of courts that 
comes to a forefront. We may point to around fourteen references that came from 
the  Hungarian Supreme Court (present Kúria, previously Legfelsőbb Bíróság). 
57 See in that respect the texts by Wyrozumska and Skomerska-Muchowska in the present vol-
ume.
58 Case ÚS 5/12 Slovak Pensions XVII (Czech Constitutional Court, 31 January 2012).
59 M. Broberg, N. Fergen (n. 10) 34.
60 Case C-302/04 Ynos kft v János Varga (CJEU, 10 January 2006) – see further reference to this 
case in the present paper.
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The rest was sent by courts of all levels, of general and specialized jurisdictions, 
adjudicating in all instances.
Accordingly, the  subject matter of  Hungarian references is  much diversified 
and it is hard to indicate one or two prevailing domains. Taking a very general-
izing approach one may state that the majority of references regarded various as-
pects of the four internal market freedoms. There was also a considerable number 
of taxation cases (seventeen) as well as questions within the field of competition 
and consumer protection (seventeen too). Some references regarded common ag-
ricultural policy (seven). What is  though especially noteworthy, there were five 
cases concerning the area of freedom security and justice. The remaining instances 
concerned e.g. jurisdiction of national courts and judicial cooperation, environ-
ment or protection of personal data. 
The Ynos case was the  first preliminary reference submitted by a Hungarian 
court. As already suggested, it regarded such an interesting and significant prob-
lem – from the perspective of application of EU law in the Member States, which 
joined in 2004 – that the CJEU despite finding the lack of jurisdiction decided over 
it by means of a judgement and not by an order which would be typical in such 
situation. The details of the proceedings before the referring court are not relevant 
for the  outcome of  preliminary ruling. It  is sufficient to state that it concerned 
the effects of unfair terms used in consumer contracts, which had been concluded 
and in respect of which a dispute had arisen before Hungary’s accession to the EU. 
However, the  provisions of  Hungarian law regarding unfair contract terms had 
already been adapted to the EU Directive 93/13 when this situation occurred.61 
The national court for that reason assumed that the  interpretation and applica-
tion of these domestic rules had to be in conformity with the Directive.62 Though 
the  national court seemed quite convinced about this assumption, it included 
within the reference, as last, a question on this particular issue.63 The CJEU, how-
ever, took an entirely opposite view and stated that it had jurisdiction to interpret 
the  Directive only as regards its application in  a  new Member State with effect 
from the date of  that State’s accession to the EU and since the  facts of  the case 
before the  referring court occurred prior to the Hungary’s accession to the EU, 
the Court did not have jurisdiction to interpret the Directive.64 Consequently, be-
fore the accession to the EU of a new Member State, no obligation could be es-
tablished for the national court to interpret the domestic law in conformity with 
the wording and purpose of the Directive. Therefore, the judicial dialogue in this 
case contributed to the clarification of the scope of the obligation of EU conform 
interpretation (the indirect effect of directives/EU law). 
61 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts O.J. L 95 
1993 29.
62 Case C-302/04 Ynos, para. 28.
63 It was preceded by two questions on the interpretation of the directive’s provisions; ibidem, 
para. 29.
64 Ibidem, 37.
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The Cartesio preliminary ruling was already referred to in the context of di-
alogue-generating features.65 Now we shall deal with the  substantial problems 
of the case, which regard freedom of establishment. Cartesio, the applicant in the 
main proceedings, was a company established under Hungarian law with a seat 
in Baja (Hungary). In November 2005 the company applied to the competent na-
tional court for registration of the transfer of its seat to Gallarate in Italy and for 
subsequent amendment of the information on its seat in the commercial regis-
ter. The company, however, was to remain governed by Hungarian law. The ap-
plication was rejected on the  ground that the  Hungarian law in  force did not 
allow a  company established in Hungary to transfer just its seat abroad while 
continuing to be subject to Hungarian law.66 According to the  registry court 
a transfer like that would require that the company ceases to exist under Hun-
garian law and, then, it re-establishes itself in  compliance with the  law of  the 
country of its new seat. Cartesio appealed against that decision to the Provincial 
Court of  Appeal in  Szeged (Szegedi Ítélőtábla). The  appellate court examined 
the up-to-date CJEU jurisprudence on freedom of establishment. It concluded 
that, so far, Arts.  49 and  54  TFEU67 did not include the  right for a  company 
established under the legislation of one Member State to transfer its central ad-
ministration (and thus its principal place of business) to another Member State 
whilst retaining its legal personality and nationality of origin. Yet, if the com-
petent authorities where to object to such rule, the content of Arts. 49 and 54 
TFUE may be further refined in the future case law of the CJEU.68 The appellate 
court subsequently referred to some judgements, which could serve as a start-
ing point for such potential development.69 Therefore the court decided to refer 
the questions concerning this problem and also some aspects of interpretation 
of Art. 267 TFEU to the CJEU. 
The Court of Justice stated that, in the absence of EU legislation, the Mem-
ber States are competent to determine the requirements under which a compa-
ny was to be regarded as established under their respective legislations and, ac-
cordingly, capable of enjoying the right of establishment, and the requirements, 
under which it was able subsequently to maintain that status. Thus the CJEU 
held that the  freedom of  establishment did not preclude one Member State 
from preventing a  company established under its national law from transfer-
ring its seat to another Member State whilst retaining its status as a  compa-
ny governed by the law of the first Member State.70 On the other hand, where 
a  company established under the  law of one Member State moves to another 
Member State it not only changes the  seat, but also is  converted into a  form 
65 See above, para. II.
66 Case C-210/06 Cartesio, paras 23–24.
67 Former Arts. 43 and 48 TEC. 
68 Case C-210/06 Cartesio, paras 34–35.
69 Ibidem, paras 36–39.
70 Ibidem, paras 109–110.
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of company governed by the law of the latter. In a situation like that the freedom 
of establishment permits a company to convert without having to be wound up 
or to enter into liquidation in  the Member State of original establishment, to 
the extent the law of the host Member State allows for such a conversion, unless 
a  restriction of  the freedom of  establishment serves overriding requirements 
of the public interest.71 
These principles were complemented by developments delivered in the VALE 
Építési preliminary ruling.72 An Italian company VALE COSTRUZIONI was estab-
lished and registered in Rome in 2000. In February 2006, the company applied to 
be deleted from that register as it wished to discontinue business in Italy in order 
to transfer its seat and business to Hungary. Subsequently it was removed from 
the Italian commercial register with a notice “the company had moved to Hun-
gary.” Instantly afterwards a company VALE Építési Kft. was incorporated and its 
representative requested a  competent Hungarian court to register the  company 
in Hungary with an entry stating that VALE COSTRUZIONI was the predecessor 
in law of VALE Építési Kft. However, that application was rejected by the Hungar-
ian registry court (Fővárosi Bíróság) on the ground that a company incorporated 
and registered in another State could not transfer its seat to Hungary and could not 
be registered there as the predecessor in law of a Hungarian company. Hungarian 
law allowed only for Hungarian companies to convert, but did not permit a com-
pany governed by the  law of  another Member State to convert to a  Hungarian 
company.73 VALE Építési appealed against the decision but the appeal was rejected 
by the Provincial Court of Appeal in Budapest (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla). The company 
then lodged another appeal to the Supreme Court (Legfelsőbb Bíróság). The Su-
preme Court shared the applicant’s serious doubts as to the compatibility of Hun-
garian provisions in respect of company conversion with the EU law, in particular 
freedom of establishment, and submitted the preliminary reference to the CJEU 
on that matter. 
The CJEU started its reasoning with an assertion that in the absence of a uni-
form regulation of  companies in  EU law, it was for the  national legislation to 
determine the  conditions of  their incorporation and  functioning. Therefore, 
the host Member State may determine the national law applicable to cross-bor-
der company conversions and  apply its domestic provisions on the  conversion 
of its national companies.74 However, the Court argued that under the Hungarian 
law companies were treated in general manner differently according to whether 
the conversion was domestic or of a cross-border nature, since only the former 
was provided for in Hungarian legislation. Such discriminatory treatment is very 
likely to deter companies, which have their seat in other Member States from ex-
ercising the freedom of establishment and amounts to an unjustified restriction 
71 Ibidem, para. 111.
72 Case C-378/10 – VALE Építési Kft. (CJEU, 12 July 2012).
73 Ibidem, 9–11.
74 Ibidem, paras 28–29.
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on the exercise of that freedom.75 Thus the CJEU concluded that Arts. 49 and 54 
TFEU had to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which 
enabled companies established under its national law to convert, but did not al-
low, in  a  general manner, companies governed by the  law of  another Member 
State to convert to companies governed by law of  the former Member State.76 
In  respect of  the application of  existing national provision to the  cross-border 
conversions, the  CJEU pointed that they needed to be applied in  compliance 
with the  principles of  equivalence and  effectiveness, to ensure the  protection 
of the rights which individuals acquire under EU law. Therefore, the application 
of Hungarian provisions on domestic conversions governing the establishment 
and functioning of companies, such as the requirements to draw up lists of as-
sets and liabilities and property inventories, cannot not be questioned.77 Analog-
ically, where a Member State requires, in the context of a domestic conversion, 
a strict legal and economic continuity between the predecessor company and the 
converted successor company, such a  requirement may also be imposed in  the 
context of a cross-border conversion.78 The CJEU stressed, however, that EU law 
precluded the Member State from refusing to record in  its register, in  the case 
of cross-border conversions, the original company (of another Member State) as 
the predecessor in law of the converted company, if such a record was made in re-
spect of domestic conversions.79 
The examples of Cartesio and VALE Építési demonstrate that the dialogue with-
in the preliminary reference procedure may lead to elaboration of quite detailed 
rules regulating in a comprehensive way of a legal issue in the absence of common 
EU legislation thereon – in this case regarding the cross-border company conver-
sions in the context of the freedom of establishment.
Among the  preliminary references submitted by Hungarian courts there 
is a relatively small but topically important share of cases concerning the area 
of  freedom, security and  justice, with particular regard to rights of  third 
country nationals.80 The  one concerning probably the  most unusual problem 
is  Shomodi. In  this case, the  Hungarian Supreme Court (Legfelsőbb Bíróság) 
sought the  CJEU’s interpretation of  provisions of  EU Regulation 1931/2006 
on local border traffic in  relation to the Convention implementing Schengen 
75 Ibidem, para. 34.
76 Ibidem, para. 41.
77 Ibidem, para. 52.
78 Ibidem, para. 55.
79 Ibidem, para. 56.
80 See CJEU cases: C-404/07 Győrgy Katz v István Roland Sós (9 October 2008); C-31/09 Nawras 
Bolbol v  Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal (17 June 2010); C-254/11 Szabolcs-Szat-
már-Bereg Megyei Rendőrkapitányság Záhony Határrendészeti Kirendeltsége v Oskar Shomodi 
(21 March 2013); C-364/11 Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott and Others v Bevándorlási és Állam-
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Agreement.81 Under that Convention, foreign nationals not subject to a  visa 
requirement may move freely within the  Schengen area for a  maximum pe-
riod of three months during the six months following the date of first entry.82 
The Regulation 1931/2006 contains specific provisions that apply to third coun-
try nationals who are residents in a border area of a non-Member State, which 
borders a Member State of the EU (an area that extends no more than 30 kilo-
metres from the border). The ‘border residents’ may obtain a local border traffic 
permit, which enables them to enter the neighbouring Member State and re-
main there for an uninterrupted period. The duration of  this period is deter-
mined by agreements concluded between the neighbouring States (on the ba-
sis of  the Regulation 1931/2006) but may not exceed three months and  such 
permits do not authorise their holders to move beyond the border area of the 
Member State visited.83 The agreement on the local border traffic between Hun-
gary and Ukraine determines the maximum duration of a stay in Hungary for 
Ukrainian border residents as three months of uninterrupted stay.84 Mr. O. Sho-
modi, a Ukrainian national is a holder of a local border traffic permit and ac-
cordingly is  authorised to enter the  border area of  Hungary. On 2 February 
2010 he requested entry into Hungary at the Záhony border crossing, however 
the Hungarian border police found that he had stayed in Hungarian territory 
for 105 days during the  period from 3 September 2009 to 2 February 2010, 
having entered that territory almost daily for several hours. Since he had thus 
exceeded, in  the view of  the Hungarian border police, the  time limit of  three 
months, the police denied him entry onto Hungarian territory.85
Mr. Shomodi brought an action against the  decision of  the border police to 
the  Provincial Court (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg megyei bíróság), which ruled that 
general regulations of EU and Hungarian law on cross-border traffic were not ap-
plicable. The court applied the special rules on local border traffic and found there 
was no limit on the number of entries to which the holder of a local border traffic 
permit was entitled and that the three-month limit applied only to uninterrupt-
ed stays. Therefore, the court concluded that the grounds relied on by the bor-
der police did not justify the refusal to Mr. Shomodi to enter Hungarian territory 
and reversed the decision.86 The border police appealed against this judgement to 
81 Regulation (EC) 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 
2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of  the Member 
States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention, O.J. L 405 2006 1, corrigen-
dum O.J. L 29 2007 3; Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common 
borders, signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990, O.J. L 239 2000 19. 
82 Art. 20(1) of the Convention.
83 Case C-254/11 Shomodi, para. 7.
84 Ibidem, para. 15.
85 Ibidem, para. 16.
86 Ibidem, para. 17.
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the Supreme Court (Legfelsőbb Bírósága), which referred to the CJEU questions 
on the  interpretation of  specific border traffic rules, in  particular the  character 
and way of counting of the time limits.87 
In its preliminary ruling the CJEU stated that the general rules of the Schen-
gen acquis did not apply to local border traffic and pointed out that the three 
month limit laid down by the  local border traffic regulation related only to 
‘uninterrupted stays’, whereas the  limitation resulting from the  general rules 
of  Schengen acquis did not contain that reservation.88 Moreover, by adopt-
ing the  regulation on local border traffic, the  EU legislature intended to put 
rules in place for local border traffic, which are distinct from the general rules 
of Schengen acquis and are subject to autonomous interpretation. The purpose 
of  those rules, namely, is  to enable the  residents of  the border areas to cross 
the external land borders of the EU for legitimate economic, social, cultural or 
family reasons, and to do so easily (understood as without excessive adminis-
trative constraints) and frequently, even regularly.89 However, as the CJEU not-
ed that facilitation of border crossing was intended for bona fide (‘good will’) 
border residents with legitimate reasons for frequently crossing the border, so 
the  Member States remained free to impose penalties on those who abuse or 
fraudulently used their local border traffic permits.90 Accordingly, the  CJEU 
concluded that the holder of a local border traffic permit needed to be able to 
move freely within the border area for a period of three months if his stay was 
uninterrupted and to have a new right to a three-month stay each time that his 
stay was interrupted. Consequently, in the view of the CJEU, the stay must be 
regarded as interrupted as soon as the person concerned crosses the border back 
into his State of residence in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
local border traffic permit, irrespective of the frequency of such crossings, even 
if they occur several times daily.91
Shomodi constitutes thus an example of  affirmative judicial dialogue, where 
the  CJEU entirely confirmed the  argumentation and  the propriety of  the judg-
ment of the court of first instance. It also strengthens the effectiveness of individu-
al rights – and does so in relation to a particular group of third country nationals, 
who turn out to be beneficiaries of judicial dialogue as well. 
3.3. Lithuania
Within the  period covered by our research the  Lithuanian courts submitted 
twenty-seven references, of  which none had been withdrawn and, remarkably 
none had been declared inadmissible. The total number is relatively not that small 
87 Ibidem, para. 18.
88 Ibidem, para. 23.
89 Ibidem, para. 24.
90 Ibidem, para. 25.
91 Ibidem, paras 26, 28–29.
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(although still below Union average), taking into account the size and population 
of  the country.92 Remarkably, the  Lithuanian references concern such a  variety 
of EU law issues that it is harder than in case of the three remaining States un-
der scrutiny, to organise them on the basis of their subject matter. It seems that 
there are no prevailing themes in the preliminary reference practice of Lithuanian 
courts. In fact, very often one case addressed a number of issues, including also 
systemic problems of EU legal order. It is also worth noticing, in comparison with 
the three remaining Member States that the vast majority of references comes from 
the highest judicial authorities of Lithuania, the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas 
(the Supreme Court) and  the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas (the 
Higher Administrative Court). Moreover, importantly, the Constitutional Court 
(Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas) was one of the first Lithuanian courts 
to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU.93
One of the most interesting Lithuanian cases in terms of the use of judicial 
dialogue for strengthening of the protection of individual rights is the case Pe-
ftiev.94 The case constituted a  smart challenge to EU smart sanctions adopted 
against Belarus.95 Mr. Peftiev and  other respondents in  the main proceedings 
were included in the list of persons subject to EU measures against Belarus. In 
order to challenge those measures, they hired a  Lithuanian law firm, which 
brought actions for annulment before the  EU General Court. Subsequently, 
the law firm issued four invoices for its legal services to the respondents and the 
clients transferred the corresponding sum to the law firm’s bank account. How-
ever, due to the effect of EU sanctions in force, the transferred funds were frozen 
in the law firm’s bank account. In turn, the respondents in the main proceed-
ings, according to the provisions of the sanctions regulation made a request to 
the Lithuanian authorities for lifting the measures freezing the financial funds 
in so far, as it was necessary to pay for the  legal services. The request was re-
fused, as the  funds were allegedly acquired unlawfully. Mr. Peftiev and others 
brought then actions for annulment of those decisions before the Regional Ad-
ministrative Court in Vilnius asking it to annul the decisions and to order their 
reconsideration by the administrative organs, which issued them. The court ac-
tually decided in  favour of  the respondents in  the main proceedings, but on 
this occasion the  administrative authorities appealed against the  judgment to 
the  Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court (Lietuvos vyriausiasis admin-
istracinis teismas), rising the  argument that they enjoyed on the  basis of  the 
Sanctions Regulation absolute discretion in  deciding whether or not to apply 
the derogation, because decisions in that respect were linked to political issues 
92 M. Broberg, N. Fergen (n. 10), p. 34.
93 Case C-239/07 Julius Sabatauskas and Others (CJEU, 9 October 2008).
94 C-314/13 Užsienio reikalų ministerija and Finansinių nusikaltimų tyrimo tarnyba v Vladimir Pe-
ftiev and Others (CJEU, 12 June 2014).
95 Council Regulation (EC) 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect 
of Belarus O.J. L 134 2006 1, with subsequent amendments.
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and external relations of Member States have with other States, which is an area 
in which they should have a broader freedom of action. However, the Supreme 
Administrative Court considered the problem in connection with the Council 
document “EU Best Practices for the  effective implementation of  restrictive 
measures”96 and  the CJEU case law and came to the conclusion that interpre-
tation of that kind of provision must take into account the need to ensure pro-
tection of fundamental rights, including the right to a judicial remedy. The only 
way for a person affected by a restrictive measure to have this measure annulled 
is to bring an action before the EU Court. But in order to do that, the applicant 
is  required to have legal representation (under the  Rules of  Procedure of  the 
General Court); the GC itself, as the Supreme Administrative Court observed, 
in cases of this character exhaustively examined the requests to grant the legal 
aid and, where necessary, granted it.97 On the  basis of  this analysis, the  court 
referred to the CJEU questions concerning, on one hand, the alleged absolute 
discretion of  administrative organs while deciding on granting of  derogation. 
On the other hand, the referring court, in case the scope of discretion turned out 
to be not that absolute, asked about the criteria and circumstances which must 
be regarded when the grant of derogation is decided upon (including the effec-
tiveness of  protection of  individual’s fundamental rights as well as safeguards 
against misuses of  derogation) and  whether the  (allegedly unlawful) source 
of the funds had any relevance for the decision on derogation.98 The CJEU en-
tirely supported the observations of the referring court. It started by reminding 
national authorities that when deciding on a request for release of frozen funds 
pursuant to Regulation 765/2006, they implemented EU law, and accordingly, 
they were required to observe the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union (‘the Charter’).99 In consequence, the provisions of the Regulation 
must be interpreted as meaning that, when taking a decision on granting a dero-
gation requested with an aim to enable an individual to challenge the lawfulness 
of  restrictive measures imposed by the  EU, the  competent national authority 
does not enjoy absolute discretion, but must exercise its powers in  a  manner 
which upholds the rights provided for in Art. 47 (right to effective legal remedy 
and access to court) of the Charter and observes the indispensable nature of le-
gal representation in bringing such an action before the General Court.100 As to 
provision of safeguards against the misuse of the derogation granted, the CJEU 
emphasized, that national authorities may verify whether the requested release 
of  funds was intended exclusively for payment of  reasonable professional fees 
96 Council document 11679/07 EU of 9 July 2007 “Best Practices for the effective implemen-
tation of  restrictive measures”, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%20
11679%202007%20INIT (access: 5 April 2017).
97 Case C-314/13 Peftiev, paras 20–21.
98 Ibidem, para. 22.
99 Ibidem, para. 24.
100 Ibidem, para. 34.
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and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal 
services and they may also set the appropriate conditions in order to guarantee, 
inter alia, that the objective of the sanction is not frustrated and the derogation 
granted is  not distorted.101 Finally, as the  applicable provisions of  Regulation 
765/2006 make no reference to the  origin of  the funds in  question or possi-
ble unlawful acquisition thereof, such circumstances are not relevant for grant-
ing a derogation from freezing those funds in order to pay for legal services.102 
The Peftiev ruling constitutes then a great example of judicial dialogue strength-
ening the  protection of  fundamental rights and  the position of  individual by 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights even in respect of measures 
taken the field of external policy of the EU.
Another very interesting instance of development of EU law by means of pre-
liminary ruling procedure is  the Gazprom judgment.103 The  case concerned 
a  competence dispute between a  Lithuanian court and  an arbitral tribunal 
in respect of proceedings, which involved a company Lietuvos dujos in which 
the  Lithuanian State had share. The  remaining shareholders were Gazprom 
and the German Company E.ON Ruhrgas. In 2004 the shareholders concluded 
an agreement, which contained in Section 7.14, an arbitration clause according 
to which “[a]ny claim, dispute or contravention in connection with this Agree-
ment or its breach, validity, effect or termination, shall be finally settled by ar-
bitration.” In 2011 Lithuania (represented by the Ministry of Energy) request-
ed that the  Provincial Court in  Vilnius investigates activities of  the company 
(in connection with actions of the management board which the ministry found 
improper) on the basis of the Lithuanian civil code. In return, Gazprom insti-
tuted arbitral proceedings claiming that bringing the action to Lithuanian court 
infringed the arbitral clause of the shareholders agreement. In July 2012, the ar-
bitral tribunal declared that the arbitration clause had been partially breached 
and  ordered Lithuania, in  particular, to withdraw or limit some of  its claims 
brought before the Provincial Court. Meanwhile, in September 2012, the Pro-
vincial Court ordered the investigation of the activities of Lietuvos dujos com-
pany and declared also held that an application for investigation of the activities 
of a  legal person fell within its jurisdiction and was not subject to arbitration 
under Lithuanian law. The company and the members of its management board 
appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal of Lithuania. In separate 
proceedings, Gazprom applied to that court for recognition and enforcement 
in Lithuania of the arbitral award of July 2012. The Court of Appeal dismissed 
Gazprom’s application, recalling the provisions of Lithuanian law and the Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed 
in New York on 10 June 1958.104 The court observed that, by the arbitral award 
101 Ibidem.
102 Ibidem, para. 40.
103 Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO v Lietuvos Respublika (CJEU, 13 May 2015).
104 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3.
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of  July 2012 recognition and  enforcement of  which were sought, the  arbitral 
tribunal limited the ministry’s capacity to bring proceedings before a Lithua-
nian court for initiation of an investigation in respect of the activities of a legal 
person, but also denied that national court the power to determine whether it 
has jurisdiction at all. By doing so the arbitral tribunal infringed the sovereignty 
of the Republic of Lithuania, which as contrary to Lithuanian and international 
public policy, justified the refusal to recognize the arbitral award.105 By a sepa-
rate order the court also dismissed the company’s appeal and confirmed the ju-
risdiction of  the Lithuanian courts to hear that case.106 Both orders were sub-
ject of an appeal to the Lithuanian Supreme Court. That Court decided to deal 
with the appeal concerning recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award 
and to suspend the second appeal until the first had been decided. Since the Su-
preme Court was uncertain, upon taking into account the  relevant case law 
of the CJEU and provisions of Regulation 44/2001,107 whether the recognition 
and enforcement of  the arbitral award could be refused on the grounds given 
by the Court of Appeal.108 Therefore, the Supreme Court referred to the CJEU 
some questions on the interpretation of the regulation. In its reply, the CJEU ob-
served that actually the problem of recognition of arbitral awards was expressly 
excluded from the scope of Regulation 44/2001.109 However, instead of declaring 
the lack of jurisdiction in the referred case, the CJEU went on and gave the re-
ferring court exhaustive guidance on how the courts should interpret their own 
competence-competence and the breadth of the margin of discretion they enjoy 
while determining whether they have jurisdiction over a given case or not. It is 
striking, how the Court of Justice formulated the conclusion of the judgment, 
thus linking it with interpretation of  provisions, which are  not applicable to 
the case at all:
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as 
not precluding a court of a Member State from recognising and enforcing, or from refusing 
to recognise and enforce, an arbitral award prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims 
before a court of that Member State, since that regulation does not govern the recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award issued by an arbitral tribunal in another Member State.
However, if we take into account the  role of  courts as guardians of  the rule 
of law and the growing controversies concerning arbitration as means of resolu-
tion of commercial disputes involving also States (e.g. within the recently agreed 
105 Case C-536/13 Gazprom, para. 22.
106 Ibidem, para. 23.
107 Council Regulation (EC)  44/2001 of  22  December 2000 on jurisdiction and  the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters O.J. L 12 2001 1.
108 Case C-536/13 Gazprom, para. 25.
109 Ibidem, paras 28, 40–41.
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upon CETA), we do not tend to be too critical about the CJEU’s position in the 
present case. In  addition, the  Gazprom ruling demonstrates one more function 
of judicial dialogue: that of education of judges and of the general public.
3.4. Poland
Although Poland with sixty-five cases takes a  second place (after Hungary) 
in terms of absolute numbers, the statistics are less impressive when it comes to 
classification related to size and population of the country.110 In two cases the ref-
erences were withdrawn. In  six of  the remaining cases the CJEU declared itself 
incompetent to adjudicate on the matters, however, as noticed earlier, the inadmis-
sible references are not always irrelevant for development of EU law. Nearly two 
thirds of the Polish references came from the administrative courts (the provincial 
administrative courts and  the Supreme Administrative Court Naczelny Sąd Ad-
ministracyjny). On the other end lies the Polish Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), 
which had only submitted six references. The remainder of cases originated from 
district and  provincial courts. In  respect of  subject matter of  the rulings, there 
is an overwhelming domination of tax law cases. Apart from them there are few 
concerning competition, consumer protection, problems of jurisdiction, pensions 
and a number of single other issues. Many of the cases, especially tax cases, con-
cern very particular, sometimes technical issues relevant only for the case referred. 
However, there are still numerous ones addressing fundamental, systemic prob-
lems of EU law.
One of such issues was considered in the Filipiak case,111 which revealed prob-
lems that might occur within the ‘border zone’ between the domestic constitu-
tionality review procedure and  the application of  EU law. The  main proceed-
ings before the national court (the Provincial Administrative Court in Poznań, 
Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Poznaniu) concerned the Polish income tax 
legislation which allowed for deductions of contributions paid for social security 
and health insurance in the calculation of the amount of income tax obligation 
under the  condition that these contributions belonged to categories specified 
in  Polish legislation. In  the effect, the  only contributions to be deduced were 
those paid to the institutions of Polish social security and health insurance sys-
tems. Mr. Filipiak, as a partner of a Dutch partnership, paid in the Netherlands 
the social security and health insurance contributions required of him by Dutch 
legislation, however paid his income tax in Poland. He claimed that such reg-
ulation of  Polish income tax law was incompatible with EU law, in  particular 
the internal market freedoms. Accordingly, the contested provisions could not 
be applied by virtue of  the principles of  direct effect and  primacy of  EU law. 
110 M. Broberg, N. Fergen, Preliminary References…, p. 34.
111 Case C-314/08 Krzysztof Filipiak v  Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w  Poznaniu (CJEU, judgment, 
19 November 2009).
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Unfortunately, the Polish tax authorities did not agree with him and in conse-
quence, Mr. Filipiak brought an action against their decisions to the Provincial 
Administrative Court in Poznań. 
The Court shared the applicant’s concerns as to the conformity of Polish leg-
islation with EU law and decided to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU. 
It observed, however, that it was essential to examine whether the contested Polish 
provisions were compatible with a Treaty provision, which was not relied on by 
the applicant,112 namely the current Art. 49 TFEU (former Art. 43 TEC) providing 
for the freedom of establishment. The Court also argued that the effect of the con-
tested provisions was that a taxpayer, being subject to unlimited tax liability in Po-
land on the entirety of his income and pursuing an economic activity in another 
Member State was not allowed to deduct in the calculation of his tax obligation 
the contributions for social security and health insurance paid in the Netherlands 
also paid in the Netherlands, even though those contributions were not deducted 
in that Member State.113 Furthermore, the referring court drew attention to the fact 
that the Polish Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) had already ruled 
on the  compatibility of  the contested provisions of  the law on income tax with 
the Polish Constitution, holding that
 
to the extent to which the tax provisions at issue do not allow taxpayers specified in Article 
27(9) of the Law on income tax to deduct social security and health insurance contributions 
from income deriving from an activity pursued outside the Republic of Poland and  from 
the tax payable thereon where those contributions were not deducted in the Member State 
in which that activity was pursued, those provisions are not compatible with the principle 
of equality before the law laid down in Article 32 of the Polish Constitution, in conjunction 
with the principle of social justice, set out in Article 2 of that Constitution.114
The Constitutional Court, though, decided (pursuant to Art. 190(3) of the Pol-
ish Constitution) to defer the date when the provisions declared unconstitutional 
would lose all binding force to 30 November 2008.115 Therefore, the questions re-
ferred to the CJEU by the Provincial Administrative Court regarded on one hand, 
whether Art. 49 TFEU should be interpreted as precluding the provisions such as 
the ones in the contested Income tax law. On the other hand, the referring court 
wondered whether the principle of the primacy of EU law should be interpreted 
as taking precedence over the provisions of national law in so far as the entry into 
force of  the judgment of  the Polish Constitutional Court had been deferred on 
the basis of those provisions.116
112 Mr. Filipiak indicated Art. 45 TFEU (former Art. 39 TEC, free movement of workers).
113 Case C-314/08 Filipiak, para. 22.
114 Ibidem, paras 23–24. See: Case K 18/06 (Polish Constitutional Court, 7 November 2007).
115 Case C-314/08 Filipiak, para. 25. The maximum deference period provided for in that provi-
sion is 18 months.
116 Ibidem, para. 26.
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While responding to the first question of the Polish court, the CJEU observed 
that the refusal to grant to a taxpayer the right to deduction of compulsory con-
tributions paid in another Member State in circumstances like those in the main 
proceedings might deter individuals from taking advantage of  the freedom 
of establishment and freedom to provide services and amounted to a restriction 
on those freedoms. Such restriction could only be justified by overriding rea-
sons in the public interest.117 Thus, the CJEU concluded that EU law precluded 
the national legislation like that contested in the proceedings before the refer-
ring court.118 With regard to the second question the CJEU argued that accord-
ing to the  principle of  the primacy of  EU law, a  conflict between a  provision 
of national law and a directly applicable provision of  the Treaty needed to be 
resolved by application of EU law by a national court, and if necessary by refus-
ing the application of a conflicting national provision, and not by its annulment. 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court’s deferral of the date on which the pro-
visions, which it declared unconstitutional, would lose their binding force did 
not preclude the national courts from respecting the principle of  the primacy 
of EU law and from declining to apply those provisions as contrary to EU law. 
In the effect, the primacy of EU law obliges the national court to apply EU law 
and  to refuse to apply the  conflicting provisions of  national law, irrespective 
of the judgment of the national constitutional court deferring the date on which 
those provisions, would stop to be in  force in a national legal order.119 In  this 
way, the dialogue between the CJEU and the Polish administrative Court clar-
ified the relationship between the primacy of EU law and the effect of rulings 
of Member States’ constitutional courts. 
Another preliminary ruling originating from a Polish court, which contribut-
ed to the development of EU law was Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa.120 Polska Telefo-
nia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. (PTC) was one of the main telecommunications operators 
in Poland. In 2006, the President of  the Office for Electronic Communications 
(Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, President of UKE) identified PTC as 
having significant market power in the market for the provision of voice call ter-
mination services. By means of an administrative decision the President of UKE 
imposed on PTC certain regulatory requirements. It  is necessary to mention 
that under the  Directive 2002/21121 the  Commission is  empowered to publish 
117 Ibidem, paras 71–72.
118 Ibidem, para. 73.
119 Ibidem, paras 82–84. 
120 Case C-410/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. v Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej 
(CJEU, 12 May 2011).
121 Directive (EC) 2002/21 of  the European Parliament and  of the  Council of  7 March 2002 on 
a  common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and  services 
(‘Framework Directive’), O.J. L 108 2002 33.
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guidelines122 concerning market analysis and the assessment of significant mar-
ket power. The national regulatory authorities (NRAs – in Poland the President 
of the UKE) are obliged by the provisions of the Directive to take the said guide-
lines into account for the definition of  relevant markets appropriate to nation-
al circumstances and, in particular, of relevant geographic markets within their 
territory, in accordance with the principles of competition law.123 The PTC con-
tested the decision before Polish courts, claiming that the decision was based on 
the  Commission Guidelines issued in  2002 and  since they had not been pub-
lished in  Polish in  the Official Journal of  the European Union, they could not 
be relied on against PTC (as a private company). The PTC’s action failed in two 
instances and  subsequently the  company lodged a  cassation to the  Polish Su-
preme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). The Supreme Court carefully examined the case 
law of the CJEU concerning the publication of legal acts and the binding effects 
on individuals (including the Skoma-Lux case, analysed earlier) and questioned 
the effects of the Commission Guidelines. The Supreme Court wondered whether 
the term ‘obligations contained in Community legislation’, used in para. 51 of Sko-
ma-Lux, covered (apart from regulations and  decisions) also other acts of  EU 
institutions affecting individuals’ rights or obligations and noted that the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence justified a  conclusion that this term is  interpreted rather broad-
ly.124 The Court observed that the Guidelines gave rise to legitimate legal expecta-
tions on the part of persons whose situation falls within their scope.125 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court concluded that in these circumstances Polish telecommuni-
cations undertakings were in  a  less favourable situation than undertakings es-
tablished in other Member States, which were able to acquaint themselves with 
the guidelines in the official languages of those States.126 For these reasons the Su-
preme Court decided to refer to the CJEU a question concerning the legal effects 
of  the unpublished Guidelines. The Court of  Justice in  its reply first reiterated 
that a fundamental principle of the EU’s legal order (principle of legal certainty 
– A.Cz.) required that measures adopted by the public authorities could not be 
enforceable against the persons concerned before they have had an opportunity 
to acquaint themselves with such rules. In addition, as it had been stated in Sko-
ma-Lux, the Act of Accession to the EU of i.a. Poland precluded the obligations 
provided for in EU legislation, which had not been published in the Official Jour-
nal in  the language of  a  new Member State (and that language being an offi-
cial language of the EU), from being imposed on individuals in that State, even 
though those persons could have accessed the content of that legislation by other 
122 Guidelines on market analysis and  the assessment of  significant market power under 
the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
O.J. C 165 2002 6.
123 Art. 16 of the Directive 2002/21.
124 Case C-410/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa, paras 17, 19. 
125 Ibidem, para. 20.
126 Ibidem, para. 18.
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means.127 Addressing the considerations raised by the Supreme Court, the CJEU 
pointed out that the character of the Guidelines is to be evaluated on the basis 
of their content, which justified the conclusion that they could impose obligations 
on individuals. In that respect the CJEU, after a thorough examination, observed 
that the guidelines merely set out the principles that the NRAs should use in the 
analysis of markets and effective competition under the regulatory framework for 
electronic communications.128 Consequently, the Court of Justice concluded that 
the Guidelines did not contain any obligation capable of being imposed, directly 
or indirectly, on individuals and thus the fact that they had not been published 
in the Official Journal in Polish did not prevent the Polish NRA from referring to 
them in a decision addressed to an individual. 
The Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa ruling constitutes one of the best examples of a di-
alogue approach on the part of both involved courts. The referring Supreme Court 
presented a well-elaborated set of arguments for consideration of the CJEU with 
a thorough reference to the latter’s jurisprudence on the issue. The Court of Justice 
comprehensively addressed all the doubts and points presented by the referring 
court. As the result, a ruling was issued, which truly develops the doctrine of EU 
sources of law and legal effects of sui generis acts.
The case Rubach demonstrates that, sometimes, unusual motivations stand 
behind a national court’s decision to make a preliminary reference and to enter 
the judicial dialogue.129 The case before the national District Court in Kościan 
(Sąd Rejonowy) concerned the criminal proceedings against Mr. T. Rubach. He 
acquired at a terrarium fair the exotic spiders of the genus Brachypelma Albopi-
losum, which is a protected specimen listed in Annex B to Regulation 338/97.130 
The inclusion in the Annex prohibits effectively commercial activities with re-
gard to such specimen, except where it can be proved that such specimens were 
acquired and introduced into the EU, in accordance with the legislation in force 
for the  conservation of  wild fauna and  flora.131 Mr. Rubach began breeding 
those spiders in captivity and auctioning them on the internet between Febru-
ary and October 2006. On the basis of those facts, he was charged with 46 in-
fringements of Art. 128 the Polish Law on nature protection, which penalized 
i.a. infringements “of the provisions of EU law concerning the protection of spe-
cies of wild animals and plants through the regulation of trade therein by: […] 
(d) offering for sale or purchase, purchasing or acquiring, using or displaying 
publicly for commercial purposes, selling, holding or transporting for the pur-
pose of sale, specimens of specific species of plants or animals.” In October 2007, 
the District Court in Kościan acquitted the accused of all the charges because, 
127 Ibidem, paras 23–24. 
128 Ibidem, para. 30.
129 Case C-344/08 Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach (CJEU, 16 July 2009).
130 Council Regulation (EC) 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna 
and flora by regulating trade therein, O.J. L 61 1997 1.
131 Art. 8 of the Regulation 338/97.
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in  the Court’s view, his actions did not constitute the  prohibited act. Howev-
er the district prosecutor appealed against the first instance judgement and the 
appellate court, the  Provincial Court (Sąd Okręgowy) in  Poznań, overturned 
that judgment in  its entirety and referred the case for reconsideration back to 
the District Court.132 
While reconsidering the case, the District Court observed that appellate court’s 
interpretation of national law, which was binding on the District Court, actually 
meant that the accused could avoid criminal liability, only if he were in a position 
to establish the source of the animals, either by producing a certificate of registra-
tion (as required under Article 64(1) of the Law on nature protection) relating to 
the animals sold or by supplying evidence which would make it possible to retrace 
the source of those animals and to identify with certainty the previous owner or 
breeder. However, according to the court’s investigations, the accused was unable 
to register the spiders because, as arachnids, they were not subject to registration 
under Polish law. As the court pointed out, Mr. Rubach was not required under 
Polish law to have any specific knowledge of  the origin of  the animals that he 
had bought, since he had bought them at a legal fair. In the District Court’s view, 
Mr. Rubach, as unable to produce any of the evidence required by the appellate 
court, could not avoid criminal liability. Therefore, the District Court decided to 
refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
[H]ow, under [Article 8(5) of Regulation No. 338/97] and in the light of the presumption 
of innocence, may a keeper of animals listed in Annex B [to that regulation] (which are not 
amphibians, reptiles, birds or mammals) prove satisfactorily that his specimens were ac-
quired […] in accordance with the legislation in force with regard to wild fauna and flora 
[…]? 
The CJEU considered the question very thoroughly. It observed, first, that Reg-
ulation 338/97 did not limit the evidence that might be used in order to establish 
that specimens of species listed in Annex B to that regulation have been acquired 
lawfully and the apportionment of the burden of proof should be assessed in the 
light of the principle of the presumption of innocence which is one of the funda-
mental rights protected in the EU legal order (the Court referred to its case law but 
also to Art. 6 ECHR).133 Accordingly the CJEU reminded that introduction of the 
system of protection for specimens of species listed in Annexes A and B to Regula-
tion No. 338/97 did not in any way affect the general obligation of the prosecution 
to prove that the criminal act had occurred.134 Consequently, the CJEU ruled that 
Art. 8(5) of Regulation 338/97 had to be interpreted as
132 Case C-344/08 Rubach, para. 12.
133 Ibidem, paras 29–30.
134 Ibidem, para. 32. 
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meaning that, in  the context of  criminal proceedings brought against a  person accused 
of having infringed that provision, any type of evidence accepted under the procedural law 
of the Member State concerned in similar proceedings is in principle admissible for the pur-
pose of establishing whether specimens of animal species listed in Annex B to that regulation 
were lawfully acquired. In the light also of the principle of the presumption of innocence, 
such a person may adduce any such evidence to prove that those specimens came lawfully 
into his possession in accordance with the conditions laid down in that provision.135
It is not hard to agree with the opinion that the Rubach case is quite unique 
in that it demonstrates that the preliminary ruling procedure can be used as reme-
dy against mistakes of other courts. Also in that, it shows exceptional engagement 
of the referring court, which did all that was possible, or even more, to ensure that 
the rights of an individual – including such fundamental principle as presumption 
of  innocence – are observed despite the curious findings of  the court of higher 
instance. This is the ‘human face’ of judicial dialogue.
4. Conclusion
The presented selection of  preliminary rulings on the  questions referred by 
the courts of Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland contains the ones 
that are most significant for the development of EU law. Although the number 
of  preliminary references originating from the  CEE States subject to research 
is – with the exception of Hungary – lower than the EU average, there are no dif-
ferences as to the quality of the references. The problems of interpretation of EU 
law (the questions on validity are  scarce) raised by the  national courts in  their 
preliminary references concern matters fundamental from the constitutional per-
spective of  the EU legal order as well as issues essential from the point of view 
of development of the particular domains of EU law. Quite often national courts 
show courage to present, beside the factual and legal circumstances of the cases 
pending before them, their own considerations on the problems that are subject 
of preliminary references. This way they open the field to discussion and contrib-
ute to the enrichment of judicial dialogue. This practice seems to be welcome by 
the CJEU, as the examined case law leaves the impression that the Court is inter-
ested and inspired to develop the judicial dialogue where it has the opportunity 
to engage in a ‘correspondence’ discussion of sorts with arguments of the national 
courts. In its replies the CJEU tries to be as unequivocal as possible as to the in-
terpretation of norms of EU law, but, as a rule, it leaves to national courts a wide 
135 Ibidem, para. 34.
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margin of discretion in the assessment whether and in what way the interpretation 
given may be applied in national proceedings. As the result, we may conclude that 
also in the context of the CEE States the institutionalised judicial dialogue, organ-
ised with a use of the preliminary reference, constitutes an excellent means of cre-
ation and sustainable development of international, supra-State legal order where, 
at the same time, the common Union interest, the rights of  individuals and the 
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